



CISA CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Misinformation & Disinformation Subcommittee Meeting March 1, 2022

Purpose of Meeting

- The purpose of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee (CSAC) Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Misinformation & Disinformation (MDM) Subcommittee meeting was to receive a briefing from Ms. Laura Dehmlow, Section Chief, FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF), regarding the FBI's Roles and Responsibilities in Combating Foreign Influence.

Discussion

- [REDACTED] Designated Federal Officer (DFO) for the CSAC and the MDM Subcommittee brought the meeting to order and turned the meeting over to the Chair, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] University of Washington, MDM Subcommittee Chair, introduced Ms. Dehmlow to provide an overview of the FITF's mission charter.
- Ms. Dehmlow proceeded to give background on the FITF with its start in 2016, focusing on the Russian influence on the elections and then based on mission scope, became an eighty-person organization within the FBI's Counter Intelligence Division. The office established the charter of Foreign Malign Information (FMI), which is subversive data utilized to drive a wedge between the populace and the government. Categories of MDM the FBI addresses are:
 - Undeclared – covert intelligence and activities are not transparent
 - Criminal – cyber violations or election crimes such as voter suppression
 - Coercive Activity – attempting family, political, or economic coercion
 - Foreign Actors – FTIF focuses on “actors” and “activities”, not content

The FTIF engages with policy makers on the Hill and with appropriate partners for information exchange. It also works with the Department of Justice (DOJ) related to what does and does not apply based on the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

- [REDACTED] thanked Ms. Dehmlow and opened up the meeting for questions and comments by the Subcommittee Members.
 - [REDACTED] asked for verification from Ms. Dehmlow that MDM is only monitored or under the purview of the FBI/FTIF based on the connection to Foreign or Criminal activity. FBI does not perform narrative or content-based analysis. [REDACTED] thought CISA might have a role based on the Subcommittee helping to define the narrative so the “whole of government” approach could be leveraged.
 - [REDACTED] further asked if there were adequate laws in place around MDM related to elections in order for the FBI to pursue misinformation. Ms. Dehmlow mentioned there were adequate laws



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in place particularly related to threats of violence at polling locations and interstate harassment; however, integrity of election results might be another matter.

- There was discussion between team members related to organizational information sharing between public/private sector; how to collaborate across channels; driving resiliency building and education about MDM; with FBI focused on foreign efforts, how do we disentangle foreign actors embedded in the MDM process; and, what is the government's strategic approach related to MDM? Ms. Dehmlow was asked to provide her thoughts or to define a goal for approaching MDM and she mentioned "resiliency". She stated we need a media infrastructure that is held accountable; we need to early educate the populace; and that today, critical thinking seems to be a problem currently. [REDACTED] Senior Advisor for Homeland Security and Director of the Defending Democratic Institutions Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that civics education should be provided at all ages.
- [REDACTED] asked the members for additional comments with regards to the Subcommittee's way forward. A series of questions was identified in order to move toward providing an approach or recommendation on MDM.
 - [REDACTED] mentioned, "How do we get to push the envelope to obtain traction in this area? Who has done appropriate social media monitoring for the government?"
 - [REDACTED] Advisor, Illinois Homeland Security, and Director, Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) asked, "Who is doing the analysis and has the reach of MDM?"
 - Ms. Kim Wyman, Senior Election Security Lead, CISA, identified a study out of Stanford University and stated a recommendation was for social media companies not to promote MDM actors, which would reduce the promulgation of information from these people.
 - [REDACTED] Legal, Public Policy, and Trust and Safety Lead, Twitter, stated Twitter utilizes a "three strike system" to de-amplify bad actors.
- The next meeting date was set for March 15 and the meeting was adjourned.



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Attendees*

Participants

Name

[Redacted]

Mr. Geoff Hale

[Redacted]

Ms. Kim Wyman

Organization

University of Washington

Twitter

CISA

CSIS

Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)

CISA

Other Meeting Attendees

Name

Ms. Laura Dehmlow

[Redacted]

Ms. Allison Snell

[Redacted]

Organization

FBI

CISA

CSIS

IEMA

CISA

JP Morgan Chase

Government and Contractor Support

Name

[Redacted]

Organization

CISA

MountChor Technologies

TekSynap

MountChor Technologies

Arcfield

Arcfield

TekSynap

Arcfield

**Meeting was held via Teams/teleconference*