If Not a Musk, Then the Navy Needs Another Rickover

Strike three! The Navy has struck out yet again.

For the third time, the Navy cancels a ship-development program

This past week, Secretary of the Navy John Phelan announced that the Navy was canceling its latest major surface warship initiative, the Constellation class frigate.  It was the third failed program, following the Zumwalt class guided missile destroyer and the littoral combat ship (LCS). In a nod to political realities, the SecNav said that the two ships currently under construction (in key swing state Wisconsin) would be built – even though the first ship was only 12% built and the second was barely started.

Mr. Phelan said that the funds already appropriated for four vessels would be diverted, and the rest the 20 ship class scrapped. Mr. Phelan said that he wouldn’t “spend a dollar if it doesn’t strengthen readiness or our ability to win,” but didn’t mention why the Constellation wasn’t an adequate or appropriate addition to the fleet, nor what would replace it.

The construction of the first two ships was over budget and already three years behind schedule. That should have been sufficient to kill the program and send a clear message to defense contractors that it wouldn’t be business as usual under this Administration.  But Mr. Phelan then clouded the message by saying that the priority was, “to grow the fleet faster to meet tomorrow’s threats,” yet never saying how future construction times would be improved. It is no secret why the Constellation project was a disaster. The Navy simply couldn’t get out of its own way.

Goals of the Constellation class

The Constellation was supposed to be based on a proven European FREMM design used by the French and Italian navies.  85% of the American vessel was supposed to be the same as the European ships, but that quickly devolved to about 15%. American planners – with help from so-called friends in Congress – decided the FREMM didn’t meet American survivability standards, didn’t have enough space for larger missile systems, and the metric system of measurements wasn’t compatible with the American equipment that would be placed on board. Unfortunately, most of these objections didn’t arise until construction was already underway.

 The Constellation project is just the latest example of the Navy’s ineptness. The two debacles that preceded it – the Zumwalt and LCS – were also the victims of similar institutional failures: repeated design changes after construction began, unproven technologies, and mission creep to compensate for earlier failures.  (There’s also the Ford class nuclear aircraft carrier, which, while finally being successfully integrated into the fleet, was years behind and billions of dollars over budget.) Unless dramatic changes are made at once, it is inevitable that the Constellation’s replacement – and future projects after that – are doomed to make the same mistakes.

Does the Navy need a Musk?

It is no secret that the officers put in charge of these projects – as smart and dedicated as they are – are no match for a Navy and an industry bureaucracy that will devour (or co-opt) them before they complete their two-year tours of duty.  Indeed, why would a successful ambitious officer even try to challenge a system that has rewarded predecessors who succeeded by merely maintaining the status quo?   

Smart observers have suggested that the Navy needs an Elon Musk – or Mr. Musk himself – to shake things up, someone to challenge root assumptions and procedures. Unfortunately, no political administration – Democrat or Republican – is likely to find someone of Mr. Musk’s talents to devote the time necessary to take on such a challenge.  (Mastering the Navy’s arcane culture, systems, and organization is no small feat.) Nor would most entrepreneurs accept such a challenge simply for a government paycheck and a heartfelt “thank you.”

The solution is not to hope for a transformational outsider, but to enlist a true iconoclastic insider.  A lifer who knows and understands the Navy, but is willing to challenge the very system he succeeded in. Someone who knows where many of the bodies are buried (and may even be responsible for some of them). The model I have in mind is Hyman Rickover, the father of the nuclear Navy.

The true model: Adm. Hyman Rickover

Rickover was a career officer but never destined for a top admiral’s position. Yet his vision, brains, force of personality, and key Congressional support enabled him to create not only the world’s preeminent submarine force, but also a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier design that still remains unrivalled. That Rickover probably overstayed his welcome is barely debatable. But his value in changing the course of Navy for the better is unquestioned.

The Administration could choose from a handful of very capable, very successful retired officers and say, “Please take on this challenge. Do it for five years, and we’ll give you significant bonuses based on long-term success. We want you to have the power and the financial incentives to really shake things us up. In return, you agree never to go to work for a defense contractor.”

Would retired admirals such as Sandy Winnifeld, Scott Swift, or Bill Moran – all who reached the top echelon of the Navy despite hints of iconoclasm – be willing to take on such a mission? We’ll never know if we don’t ask them. But we do know that very little will change unless the Navy changes course.

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.