On the 2025 National Security Strategy

Well, it is here! President Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS).

Outline of the National Security Strategy

Right off the bat I have to say I like the focus on the elements of a “strategy.”  Students of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curricula learn that a good working definition of strategy is the way that means are employed to achieve desired ends, while considering risk.^[i] The ends describe what is to be achieved and provide a baseline for determining if the strategy is on track and is ultimately successful.  The ways describe how resources will be employed, and how activities will be ordered and synchronized. The means are the resources to be employed. Risk provides an opportunity to examine what happens if the ends can’t be achieved, or the means aren’t available, or the ways aren’t effective, etc.

The following is a little bit of semantic nit-picking, but where the NSS definition of a strategy gets a little muddled is when it tries to discuss “ways.”  It asks, for example, “How can we connect ends and means into a viable National Security Strategy?,” when the connection between means and ends is the “ways,” not the strategy – the strategy is the way means are used to achieve ends. The strategy is the whole thing, not the “how” of means being used to achieve ends – but again, this is nitpicking – in general, as I said, I like the structure.

Partial commentary on the strategy

Of course, “risk” is not addressed at all. One might be excused for this, as it is not included in the DoD definition of “strategy,” and including the risk of not achieving a certain end can be more self-serving than useful. But there are risks, for example, in pursuing a given strategy, and it might be good to know the President considered those risks, and how they might be mitigated, or why they must be borne.

So, on to some specific comments; I will only comment on specific items, the reader can infer I have no real opinion, one way or the other, on the items I do not comment on:

Section II, Part 1: “What Do We Want Overall?”

I believe all NSSs agree on the first point, that we want the continued survival and safety of the United States, but it must be said, and the NSS leads off with this. None of the next three paragraphs are particularly controversial, as they enumerate some of the specific securities the NSS intends to achieve.

It is the fourth paragraph that had me prepared to launch into my rant on the writing of strategies.^[ii] The first sentence reads:

We want to recruit, train, equip, and field the world’s most powerful, lethal, and technologically advanced military to protect our interests, deter wars, and—if necessary—win them quickly and decisively, with the lowest possible casualties to our forces.

Note the use of verbs, “recruit, train, equip, and field” in defining this end. When you do this, you describe an action as the end, not the subject of the sentence. Why is that important? Because technically – and I am a firm believer that language has meaning – it means we don’t want, as our end, a “technologically advanced military,” we want the ability to build one. Is that an issue? Maybe not, but it is important to be clear, as the NSS provides information to Congress and guidance to the Executive branch on what you are trying to achieve.

Conflating means and ends in discussion of strategy

The next sentence brings a potential means into a discussion of ends. Golden Dome is a proposed weapon system, and as such could be considered a means, not an end: the end would be the ability to defend against missile threats, Golden Dome would be one way of doing that. Choosing what are ends, ways and means is a common challenge associated with the writing of strategies. I once had a long discussion with an instructor on whether the military was a means or a way, and the answer often depends on your viewpoint.

Why is it wrong to define Golden Dome as an end, and not a mean? Well, it isn’t, really: it’s the President’s NSS, and if an end he wants to achieve is Golden Dome, so be it. But what does the nation need for its security? The nation needs to be free from missile attack. Won’t Golden Dome ensure the nation is free from missile attack? Maybe, if it works – but there are real concerns Golden Dome will only contribute to but not ensure the nation is free from missile attack. I would have preferred that ends discuss the desire to be free from missile attack, while means discuss how to achieve that – and maybe the degree to which it may not be achievable (ahh, risk again!).

Section II, Part 2: “What Do We Want In and From the World?”

This section seeks to define America’s “core, vital national interests” as they relate to foreign policy. As such, one can really think of them as desired ends, but the text uses the odd construct of defining them as “wants” (I think) – let’s take a look…

The first bullet defines the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which as an end can be summarized as a Western Hemisphere that is stable and well-governed; whose governments cooperate with the U.S. in countering trans-national crime; that is free from outside (the Hemisphere) hostile foreign incursion and ownership of key assets; and a Hemisphere in which the U.S. retains access to key strategic locations.

In addition to the word “want” – more on that later – the next bullet mixes two seemingly unrelated items, combatting harmful foreign influence on the American economy with keeping the “Indo-Pacific” free and open. Again, note the use of verbs to describe the ends; and again, while this is not necessarily wrong, it does imply these are ongoing efforts, not something that can be achieved – and there is nothing wrong with that, but the reader should recognize when it is occurring.

The wording of the next end is instructive:

We want to support our allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe, while restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.

Again, conflating means and ends

I have no idea what the second clause means, so I won’t comment on it, but the first phrase is interesting. What is an end is not the freedom and security of Europe, but instead our desire to help “our allies” preserve those things. Why not just clearly state that the freedom and security of Europe is the desired end? And what do we mean by “Europe”? Is Russia in “Europe”? If it is, that would certainly change the implications of this end!

The more problematic issue with this end, though, is mixing ways in with ends, not to mention quantifying the way. The text says we “want” to “support our allies” in achieving “freedom and security of Europe.”  “Our allies” in Europe are the member nations of NATO; this leaves out all sorts of players, like Russia, Ukraine, the UN’s Security Council (UNSC), the European Union (EU), etc. Do they not have an important role in determining the security of Europe? What are we to understand about the use of the word “want”? Can something happen to convince us that we no longer “want” to do this? Is it conditional on our allies accepting our support? It just seems very strange to have this word in the definition of an end.

The next paragraph again uses the word “want” when talking about preventing an “adversarial power” from dominating the Middle East. Presumably, we would accept a friendly power dominating the Middle East…

Section III:  What Are America’s Available Means to Get What We Want?

This is the section one would expect to enumerate the tools and resources – the means – available to use it various ways to achieve the stated ends – and it does, at a very high level. There is nothing particularly wrong with that, of course; the NSS is, after all, a high-level document. Where this section strays is in its discussion of things the Administration has already done, which does not belong in a discussion of means. In fact, a discussion of what has already been done does not belong in this document at all, which is essentially a high-level plan to be executed.

To be clear, I have no objection to an ongoing description and analysis of what is being done to execute the NSS – I think that would be quite valuable. This might be a good time to point out that the legislation that required a NSS required it to be delivered to Congress annually.^[iii] President Reagan has the best track record there, but no President since then has come close to meeting this requirement, and we can expect this to be the only NSS this President will produce. 

Section IV, Part 1: Principles

As mentioned earlier, the NSS uses the word “strategy” when it means ways, but as long as the reader keeps that straight, I think we’ll be alright.

Frankly, the first two paragraphs of this section don’t say anything concrete, but the third does: it makes clear that “stopping regional conflicts before they spiral into global wars” is important, and it says the President will use “unconventional diplomacy, America’s military might, and economic leverage” to address these circumstances.  With respect to the tools of national power, Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME), is the NSS implying a priority of usage here? It is unclear, so let’s read on!

The next portion provides a bulletized list of the “basic principles” that should drive policy, and I do think it useful to have these enumerated. The first principle, “Focused Definition of the National Interest,” reminds us that “to focus on everything is to focus on nothing,” and I think that is a useful cautionary note.

Peace through strength

The next principle is “Peace Through Strength,” which asserts that “strength is the best deterrent,” implying that strength alone ensures deterrence. Uh, no, it doesn’t. Deterrence also requires that the will to use strength be clearly communicated to the party to be deterred. If the party to be deterred does not know you don’t want them to do whatever you don’t want them to do, they won’t be deterred from doing it; if the party doesn’t believe you will use your strength if they do whatever you don’t want them to do, they won’t be deterred from doing it.

Finally, strength – even backed by will and clear communication – is no guarantor of deterrence, as the effectiveness of deterrence is determined by the party to be deterred, not by the one trying to do the deterring. There is no real recognition of these issues here, so it will be interesting to see if this is addressed, explicitly or implicitly, in later sections.

Predisposition to non-interventionism? Not shown thus far

“Predisposition to Non-Interventionism”? I am sorry, but I have to comment on the assertion that “this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention”: so far this President, without consulting with Congress, bombed the Houthis, bombed the Iranians, has sunk numerous suspected drug smuggling boats, “closed” Venezuelan air space, and is threatening Venezuela with armed attack.  I can think of no other period in history where the U.S. has committed acts of war against so many nations in such a short amount of time. But I do like the principle, so let’s see where we go from here…

“Flexible Realism” and “Primacy of Nations.”  I talked about this Administration’s views on liberal internationalism in an article published in March 2025.^[iv]  These principles are entirely aligned with those observations.  How this Administration views the United Nations is likely no surprise, but it will be interesting to see how statements like “reforming those institutions so that they assist rather than hinder individual sovereignty and further American interests” apply to organizations like NATO.

It is interesting to see the “Balance of Power” strategy for international relations called out explicitly. I have argued that this Administrations recognizes three global powers and their spheres of interest, which is not inconsistent with this strategy.^[v]  We shall see…

Section IV, Part 2: Priorities

It is not clear if the priorities listed in this section are provided in order of importance, but without any indication one way or the other, it is natural to assume that they are. Given that, it is instructive that “The Era of Mass Migration Is Over” is listed first. Recall that we are talking about the priority of ways that resources will be used, which is a little odd, but interesting: usually strategies prioritize what you will achieve, ends, not the ways you will employ means.

The “Burden-Sharing and Burden-Shifting” priority includes a discussion of the “Hague Commitment” for NATO members to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. The U.S. spends well less than this amount, and unless the U.S. suffers a severe recession, it is not clear this Administration will achieve that goal. This priority also introduces a “burden-sharing network” to ensure “that burdens are shared and that all such efforts benefit from legitimacy.”  This seems to imply that the “sharing of burdens” will be evaluated for “legitimacy” – it is not clear how that works in practice: if a burden is determined to not be shared equally, is some remedial step taken? And who makes the determination, by what process?

More conflation

Reading the remaining priorities, one is reminded that these are prioritizing what will be done, not what will be achieved – but they read more like end states, not ways resources will be used to achieve outcomes. The NSS started out suggesting an ends–means–ways construct, but it all seems to get confused in this section. That being said, the NSS is clear about what it wants to do and achieve, which is the key point.

Section IV, Part 3: The Regions

This section begins with a reminder that to focus on everything means focusing on nothing, and a promise to focus on the regions of the world that represent “core national interests” – fair enough! Again, priority is not listed, but I think can be reasonably implied by order.

The section opens with the Western Hemisphere, and re-affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and the Trump Corollary. I am not entirely sure how nations within the hemisphere will view a bald attempt to “restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” much less other nations that have strong economic (especially) and political ties to the region. At least the NSS is clear on what the goals are, and this hemisphere being exclusively the “sphere of influence” of the United States is consistent with the vision I outlined previously.^[vi]  I would note, however, that this has been a consistent U.S. policy since the times of, well, President Monroe.

Of note, the NSS discusses how the “United States must reconsider our military presence in the Western Hemisphere”, but the areas that are discussed for the military to address are more law enforcement issues rather than military ones: there is no identification of a military threat in the region (which is a good thing, of course!).  But militaries are different than law enforcement organizations, and the U.S. has always kept the functions separate, although sometimes in supporting roles. This appears to signal a change in that dynamic, as the recent strikes on suspected drug boats would indicate.

Incorporating tariffs into national security strategy

With regard to “strengthening our own economy and industries,” the NSS talks about using “tariffs and reciprocal trade agreements.”  It will be interesting to see if this includes expanding the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to other nations, as has been discussed in the past. There is no mention of the USMCA in the NSS; given that the USMCA expands and strengthens the economic power of the U.S., this seems a little odd.

The second region addressed is Asia, and in the section heading it summarizes the goal for this region: win the economic future while preventing military confrontation. The first paragraph criticizes the goal of enticing China to enter the “rules-based international order” through economic opening of China, and it’s a valid criticism – although it was such an attractive prospect – America gets rich AND China becomes a friend – that one can see why it was pursued.

In the “Deterring Military Threats” portion of this section, the assertion is made that “maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent large-scale military conflict.”  You can have the best economy and technology in the world, but if you do not have a military able to defeat a given adversary, the will to defeat that adversary, and the clear communication of that will and capability, you don’t have deterrence – period.

Taiwan

The section then goes on to outline the geographic and economic importance of Taiwan, and states that deterring a conflict over Taiwan is ideally accomplished by “preserving military overmatch.”  The section then reiterates the policy of the United States not supporting “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”  The text goes on to say that the U.S. “will build” a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain – implying the U.S. military is not capable today of doing that, an interesting admission – but reminding the reader that there is an expectation of our security partners in the region to do their part in securing this goal.  Of note, the text discusses the importance of freedom of the seas in the South China Sea, and the need to increase our naval capability to help ensure that freedom.

Europe

The third priority region in the NSS is Europe. It begins with the assertion that Europe’s real problem is that its share of world GDP has fallen from 25% in 1990 to 14% today and blames that on national and transnational regulations that stifle economic development. That may be, but I think the real cause is the growth of China, principally enabled by economic partnership with…the U.S. That extraordinary growth by China had to come at the expense, in terms of a percentage of the overall pie, from some other countries in the world – that is how pies work.

It is important to note that the U.S. percentage of world GDP has remained roughly the same, which is a good sign, and that the three European countries that were in the top ten largest economies in the world in 1990 – France, Germany, and the UK – are still in the top ten.  So, the “economic decline” mentioned in the third paragraph is relative to the rise of China, it is not an absolute decline – in fact, the GDP per capita of ALL European countries is higher than that of China, and four of them are higher than the U.S.

Threats to Europe – and deprecating immigration

The text goes on to list a number of threats to the future of Europe, all of which other than cratering birthrates I don’t think the Europeans would agree are real or insurmountable problems. As an aside, recall that the U.S. solution to falling birthrates has historically been immigration, but this NSS splashes considerable cold water on that mitigation in the future. The NSS warns that Europe may be “unrecognizable” in 20 years; I think “unrecognizable” is a stretch, but Europe certainly faces significant challenges. It is not until the eighth paragraph in this section that the text mentions that “Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States.”  One would think that this section would lead with what Europe means to the U.S., not with a criticism of European policies.

Europe and Russia – a vital concern for strategy

The section naturally discusses Europe’s relationship with Russia and Russia’s war with Ukraine. It states that it is a “core interest” of the U.S. to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, to stabilize European economies, prevent escalation of hostilities, reestablish strategic stability with Russia, and enable reconstruction of Ukraine. Notice that none of these goals address the fact that the war is a war of territorial acquisition initiated by Russia, and that addressing that issue is a goal of ending the war. I would observe that represents quite the oversight by a permanent member of the UNSC, but since the war was initiated by another permanent member of the UNSC, it seems pointless to do so…

Finally, NATO! Surprisingly, the NATO discussion begins by suggesting that in the future NATO countries will “become non-European” – I assume they mean ethnically, not geographically(!). The text suggests that this may change how NATO countries view their place in the world or their alliance with the U.S.. This seems to me an amazing stretch.

NATO – and then the Middle East

Of note, the text says that a policy for Europe would include “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.”  I have written before about alliances and why an alliance should or should not consider adding members.^[vii] The principal country in the world that is concerned with the possibility of NATO expanding is Russia.  While Russia’s concerns might play in to an assessment of whether a country should be added to NATO or not, this is an amazing position to take up front. In any event, Ukraine is not reading this with a smile on their face…

The next section addresses the Middle East. I like the fact that it opens with the historical importance of the region to U.S. interests, and how those reasons have changed in importance. In short, the NSS signals that “America’s historic reason for focusing on the Middle East will recede.”  In contrast to the section on Europe, which stated that “our goal should be to help Europe correct its current   Fascinating…

The section on the Middle East ends as it began, with the admonition that “the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy…are thankfully over.”

Africa

Last and least, the NSS addresses Africa. That is relatively consistent with previous NSSs, as Africa has never represented a principal national interest of the U.S.. The key message here is contained in the final paragraph, where it suggests the U.S. “should transition from an aid-focused relationship with Africa to a trade- and investment-focused relationship, favoring partnerships with capable, reliable states committed to opening their markets to U.S. goods and services.”

In closing my goal in this analysis has been to evaluate the document as a tool to communicate what the Administration thinks are important with regard to national security interests, and how to go about it. It is also a little odd that it doesn’t conclude with some kind of summary. I think the NSS started out well but organizationally lost its way. I don’t think anyone can read this strategy and not have a good idea what this Administration intends, although the devil may be in the details (what does “unconventional diplomacy” mean, for example?). The next and ongoing process will be to evaluate the NSS as Administration policies are executed and effects take root – I don’t think we’ll have long to wait…

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.

Notes:

[i] The Joint definition of “strategy”, taken from The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, is “A prudent idea or set of ideas   The Naval War College (NWC) likes to add “while considering risk,” which seems eminently practical to me.

[ii] https://stariconsultingservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Rant_Poorly-Written-Strategies.pdf

[iii] Section 603, “Annual Report on National Security Strategy”, of the “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, https://history.defense.gov/portals/70/documents/dod_reforms/goldwater-nicholsdodreordact1986.pdf.  By the way, the legislation specifies the required contents and suggests a high-level outline:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States.

[iv] https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/03/31/a_tripartite_word__sort_of_1100856.html

[v] https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/03/31/a_tripartite_word__sort_of_1100856.html

[vi] https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/03/31/a_tripartite_word__sort_of_1100856.html

[vii] https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/07/14/to_ally_or_not_to_ally_842411.html