Assessing Israel’s Approach in Gaza

We summarize the general observations developed by The Dupuy Institute in a quantitative review of the outcomes of 60 insurgencies since World War II.  We then apply the resulting principles to the current Israeli efforts in Gaza. This assessment looks unpromising for the Israelis and, therefore, of concern for the U.S.

How is Israel doing in Gaza?

Can we assess, objectively, how well Israel is conducting its counterinsurgency in Gaza?

The Dupuy Institute (TDI) published one of the very few writings that assessed counterinsurgency approaches based on quantitative data. (Lawrence, America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam ) To summarize briefly (and any misstatements or oversimplifications are entirely the responsibility of the current author), the main points were:

List of criteria

1. Force ratios are critical. Counterinsurgencies tend to fail unless they employ at least four, and most often more than ten, times the force of the insurgents.
2. Successful counterinsurgencies require long-term involvement, typically more than 15 years, sometimes as long as 30 years. Holding territory requires more resources than taking it. Quick victories are rare, even with what seems to be overwhelming force.
3. Brutality toward the civilian population (including some who may appear to be civilians part of the time and become insurgent fighters at other times) tends to inflame the insurgency. Unless the counterinsurgency is willing and able to wipe out the insurgents completely, less repressive approaches generally are more effective than brutality.
4. Not providing a path toward peaceful addressing of grievances fuels the insurgency.
5. Insurgencies rallied by nationalism and/or defense of a home territory tend to succeed. Insurgencies focused on other motives, such as an ideological cause, tend to fail.
6. Terrain in which the insurgents have ample top cover, such as jungle or tunnels, blocking aerial surveillance of and attacks against their activities, helps the insurgents.
7. It is not clear how much the insurgency is helped by proximity to a supportive regular army, but some analyses indicate that such proximity may support the insurgency. Definitely proximity to reliable sources of supply helps the insurgents. Generally, it helps the counterinsurgents if they can isolate the battlefield.

Compare Israel and Gaza to the general case

The Israelis appear to be flying in the face of every one of these considerations.

1. There are two million people in Gaza. If as few as three percent of them are active Hamas fighters, that’s 60 thousand – an optimistic number from the counterinsurgents’ point of view. A four-to-one ratio would necessitate 240 thousand Israeli soldiers. Ten-to-one would be 600 thousand. According to an estimate reported by Al Jazeera, citing the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Israel now has 169,500 military on active duty in Gaza and elsewhere, and another 465,000 in reserves, of whom about 50,000 are active in Gaza, bringing the total troop strength in Gaza to about 300,000. (Other sources give similar estimates.). Hence even 600,000 is a far larger force than Israel, a nation of 10.9 million of whom about eight million are Jews, is likely to be able to deploy in Gaza, much less to sustain.
2. Sustaining a force of this size for 15 years seems even more infeasible.
3. “Hit ‘em again, hit ‘em again, harder, harder” is a popular cheer at American football games, but it is an unwise counterinsurgency strategy. However, that is what the Israelis appear to want to pursue.
4. Israel has made it clear that it opposes a statehood solution or any other accommodation with the insurgents.
5. The war has driven the Palestinians into more cohesion around a nationalistic cause, seemingly reducing some tribal and small regional differences among them. The perception that the insurgents are fighting for a homeland also raises their attractiveness to outside nations that might want to help them.
6. Gaza is full of an extensive network of tunnels, as the Israelis have reported.
7. The Israelis have acknowledged the great difficulty of isolating any part of the battlefield – even just within Gaza City.

In sum

Finally, if, as the Israelis have claimed, https://news.sky.com/story/doha-strikes-hamas-latest-israel-idf-qatar-gaza-live-updates …most of the leaders of Hamas are not in Gaza, but safely ensconced somewhere else, inflicting casualties in Gaza serves only to give the leaders of the insurrection more to complain about to the rest of the world, without imposing on those leaders any costs that would induce them to stop the conflict.

In short, purely from the standpoint of likely military effectiveness, the current Israeli approach in Gaza and the United States’ support for it seem inconsistent with the lessons of history and, consequently, ill advised.

I have carefully restricted my comments to military effectiveness, as I claim no expertise in international law or moral codes. I am moved to note, however, that if what you are doing seems highly unlikely to work, there is little to be gained by debating whether you have a right to do it.

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.