Will 2026 Be a Normal Midterm?

7 Presidents, 5 Midterms, 3 Realignments, 2 Studies 42 Years Apart, and a Speaker of the House

Although much can change before November and a great deal depends on the resolution of the Iran War, as matters now stand, conventional wisdom and early polling have it that Republicans will lose a significant number of seats and their slim House majority in the midterm.

Substantial in-party midterm losses are the rule (averaging 21 seats in recent midterms), but there are exceptions. In three of the 28 post-1912 midterms, the president’s party actually gained some seats (fewer than 10) and in another five the losses were minor (also fewer than 10).

The rare seat-gain midterms are Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal realignment midterm of 1934 with a soaring Depression-recovery economy (GDP up 10.8% in 1934), Bill Clinton’s post-impeachment midterm in 1998 (with GDP up 4.5%) and George W. Bush’s 2002 midterm a year after 9/11. More on the 1934 midterm later.

The five midterms with minor losses for the president’s party are Calvin Coolidge’s 1926 midterm with big tax cuts and a booming economy (GDP up 5.9%); John F. Kennedy’s 1962 midterm in the wake of the October Cuban missile crisis plus a booming economy (GDP up 6.1%); Ronald Reagan’s 1986 post-stagflation midterm; George H.W. Bush’s foreign affairs-dominated 1990 midterm (the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron Curtain); and Joe Biden’s weakened “red wave” midterm of 2022.

In seven of eight midterm elections, the President was popular

One thread runs through seven of these eight midterms: The incumbent presidents were very popular. The two earliest (1926 and 1934) took place before presidential approval polling, but each was preceded by and followed by presidential landslides. In the other five exceptional midterms, pre-election presidential ratings were uncommonly high, ranging from 58% for G.H.W. Bush in 1990 to 66% for Clinton in 1998.

The one outlier is 2022. At his 2022 midterm, Biden’s approval rating in Gallup stood at only 40%. Despite being nearly 20 points short of presidential standings in all seven previous “good midterms,” Democrats with Biden at the helm lost only nine seats in what had been widely anticipated to be a big Republican year. More on this later.

Midterm history’s forecast is crystal clear: If 2026 is normal, Democrats will retake the House.

But the “if” raises three central questions:

1. Are there plausible reasons to think the 2026 midterm election might not be normal, that the electorate might be realigning in its partisanship?
2. If the public is indeed primed for a realignment, how might President Trump best campaign to turn the public’s inclination into seats?
3. Are there other reasons why 2026 might not be a normal midterm?

Two Studies

These questions brought to mind a pair of studies I made of two of the unusual midterms. The first is from 45 years ago in 1981. Its purpose was to learn what made FDR’s approach to his 1934 midterm so successful and what lessons might be drawn from that for President Reagan’s 1982 midterm.

The second is my 2023 study of how Democrats fended off the anticipated “red wave” in Biden’s 2022 midterm.

Though written 42 years apart about midterms 88 years apart, both provide perspectives President Trump and the Republicans might find useful this year.

The particulars of the who (the seven presidents and the House Speaker) and the when (the five midterms and the three realignments) from the subtitle are identified here.

Study #1: The 1934 Midterm

In the summer of 1981, at the end of my first year as an assistant professor at the University of Georgia, I was approached by the Republican National Committee on behalf of Rep. Newt Gingrich to conduct a study potentially useful to President Reagan and the Republican Party going into the 1982 midterm. Anticipating the nation might be realigning after Reagan’s 1980 victory, Gingrich asked me to study how Franklin Roosevelt campaigned in 1934, his first midterm in the iconic New Deal realignment. The reasoning was that what worked for FDR in 1934 might guide how Reagan should campaign in 1982, possibly another realigning period.

There were good reasons in 1981 to suspect conditions were ripe for a Republican realignment. The Democratic Party by the 1970s was in disarray. Political scientists as well as journalists wrote extensively about the de-alignment or decomposition of the New Deal party system. In “The Party’s Over,” esteemed political analyst David Broder in 1971 observed, “We are in the stage of the political cycle where party realignment is overdue.”

A decade later, with a push from Jimmy Carter’s failed presidency, many thought a realignment was finally on the horizon.

And it was – only at another decade’s distance. Long-held Democratic Party loyalties took time for Republicans to overcome, particularly in the solid South. The staggered, national realignment to partisan parity wasn’t completed until Clinton’s 1994 midterm when southern Republicans finally broke through (and Gingrich became Speaker of the House).

From 1934 to 1982 to 2026?

Political conditions facing Reagan’s Republicans in 1982 had much in common with those of Roosevelt’s Democrats in 1934. And both have a good deal in common with conditions facing Trump and the GOP this year – though extreme party polarization accompanied by a deep-seated antipathy toward President Trump (in parts of the public and much of the legacy press) may be impediments of a different sort.

To the basic similarities: Each presidential party confronted an aging party system; a significant number of independents (or new voters) and disgruntled partisans in the opposition party; an unpopular predecessor leaving office with many serious national problems; and a new president with a strong active agenda addressing – though not yet completely solving – those inherited problems.

FDR had Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression. Reagan had Jimmy Carter with the Iranian hostage crisis, an energy crisis, and sky-high inflation and interest rates. Trump has Joe Biden with a long list of crises including high inflation, massive illegal immigration, growth-stifling energy policies, large-scale government waste and fraud, a weaponized bureaucracy, and foreign policy problems ranging from Iran’s unchecked nuclear program and its sponsorship of terrorism to the Russia-Ukraine war.

And there are some indications the public may be primed for a populist-conservative realignment. Sociologically, though the college-educated, particularly women, are increasingly aligned with the Democrats, working and middle class voters and an increasing number of minority voters are moving toward the Republicans. This is likely a net gain for Republicans.

The Eighty-twenty Doom Loop

In terms of issues, on one 80-20 issue after another – controlling the border, reducing taxes, keeping men out of women’s spaces, merit-based non-DEI standards, incarcerating violent criminals, voter ID, rooting out fraud and waste in government programs, and even opposing socialism – Democrats have grabbed the short end of the stick (see here, here, and here).

Ideological voting trends also favor Republicans. Democrats have increasingly become dependent on votes from the left. In the 1990s, they drew about a third of their vote from liberals. That increased by about 10 points since Obama. As a result, the party has moved significantly leftward. The caucus of moderate Democratic senators these days meets when Sen. Fetterman has lunch alone in his office.

In a highly polarized electorate historically tilted to conservatives (by 12 points in 2024), a party run by and for a 25% liberal minority is at a disadvantage. According to Gallup, among the “record-high 45% of U.S. adults identified as political independents,” about twice as many are conservatively rather than liberally inclined (47% to 24%). Even a large majority of moderate Democrats (62% in Gallup) think their party has gone too far to the left.

Sadly, a wide patriotism gap has also emerged. A decade ago, 90% of Republicans and 80% of Democrats told Gallup they were proud to be Americans. In 2025, that 10-point difference ballooned to 56 points (92% of Republicans to 36% of Democrats) (here and here).

Republicans can more easily beat today’s Democrats

The Democratic Party isn’t your parent’s big-tent, center-left New Deal coalition anymore, and that should raise the Republican Party’s prospects.

But, as 1982 demonstrated, prospects in a midterm are one thing and bringing them to fruition is another. The study of 1934 may provide some clues about making the 2026 potential a reality.

Lessons From 1934

In revisiting my 1981 report to Gingrich and the RNC, three lessons for 2026 suggest themselves.

Lesson 1: a midterm campaign should emphasize national unity

Franklin Roosevelt’s overarching perspective for 1934 was that the midterm should be about national unity and optimism in the recovery. The focus should be on the New Deal’s practical, commonsense actions and its real progress in making the lives of average Americans better, and that continuing support for further progress was vital. Divisiveness and overt partisanship were to be avoided.

FDR was committed to the high ground – making a simple, positive, and vigorous case for the New Deal. Roosevelt instructed his campaign to communicate the administration’s dedication to “public and not party service.”

His determination to rise above partisan politics went so far as declining invitations to the annual Jefferson Day state party dinners because of any partisan appearance. “Much as we love Thomas Jefferson,” FDR wrote to Col. Edward House, “we should not celebrate him in a partisan way.”

FDR’s two Fireside Chats in 1934 were to the point: “Are You Better Off Than You Were Last Year?” and “We Are Moving Forward to Greater Freedom, to Greater Security for the Average Man.” In the first, he stated, “I believe in practical explanations and practical policies. I believe that what we are doing today is a necessary fulfillment of what Americans have always been doing – a fulfillment of old and tested American ideals.” The New Deal was presented as guided by traditional American values applied with common sense, not by the divisive ideology of elites.

Democrats sat down in protest – of a program to protect American citizens

How might this now guide President Trump and Republicans? Although our extreme polarization, the opposition and legacy media’s visceral hostility to the president, and Trump’s personal combativeness make this difficult, Republicans should try as much as possible to keep the campaign simple, optimistic, practical and unifying – contrasting the two parties’ records in solving the nation’s problems.

President Trump’s 2026 State of the Union speech, for instance, followed FDR’s rule at many points, but the most memorable, simple and important contrast between the parties came when he asked congressional Democrats to stand up for a fundamental American political principle: “The first duty of the American government is to protect American citizens, not illegal aliens.”

Democrats remained seated.

To drive home to everyone the inclusiveness of its populist, nationalist conservatism and its contrast to the Democrats’ divisive, identity-politics progressivism, the president might think about adding a simple phrase to his motto: Make America Great Again for All Americans.

Lesson 2: an unhinged opposition makes the choice stark for midterm voters

Opposition to the New Deal took two different directions in the midterm: the loyal opposition and resistance of the Old Guard. Loyal opposition Republicans – those trying to be moderate and constructive – fared best. The Old Guard resistance was harshly partisan and unconstructive. It fared poorly.

Although well short of the unrelenting hate directed at Trump, the opposition to FDR could also be unhinged. FDR was called “un-American,” “a fascist,” “a dictator,” “fostering revolution under the guise of recovery and reform,” and governing based on “the Russian model.” The chairman of the Republican National Committee compared FDR to Mussolini and Hitler and likened him to a king (imagine that).

And, as he mentioned in his first fireside chat of 1934, FDR even took heat for “a long-needed renovation and addition to our White House.” Turns out critics of Trump’s ballroom construction have political ancestors, “prophets of calamity” as FDR called them.

Republican overreach in 1994

On more weighty matters, FDR was delighted by his opposition’s overreach. When he read “a bitter partisan attack” issued by the RNC, he wrote that “in that kind of foolishness lies our strength.”

The lesson is simple: a militant opposition makes the contrast for voters sharp and the choice clear. One side is about solving the nation’s problems; the other is about partisan obstruction.

As clear as this lesson is, it’s also clear it’s lost on Democrats. Their bitter anti-Trump reflex is ingrained. From shutting down the government to frequent impeachments to consistently taking the short side of 80-20 issues, Democrats haven’t given normal moderate independents any positive reasons to vote for them.

Lesson 3

In looking back at the 1934 study, I was struck by how frequently Thomas Jefferson was referenced with great reverence by FDR and other Democrats. James Farley, for instance, observed “the New Deal is a 20^th century model of Jefferson’s principles of government.” The New Deal “in its broad outlines,” as a young Hubert Humphrey put it in his 1940 master’s thesis at LSU, “is essentially Jeffersonian.”

Prior to and after 1934, FDR spoke at numerous Jefferson Day dinners held by state Democratic Parties. Not in an off-hand way, he told a 1940 gathering that “Thomas Jefferson is a hero to me.” In 1935, FDR established the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial in St. Louis to commemorate the Louisiana Purchase, and he named Florida’s Fort Jefferson a National Monument. And throughout his presidency, FDR was deeply involved in the construction of the Jefferson Memorial – from its inception in 1934 to the ground-breaking in 1938 to its dedication in 1943.

No political figure, in thought or by action, was more admired by Democrats than Thomas Jefferson. FDR leads the list of admirers, but the list is long, over many generations and not just among the party’s elites at their traditional Jefferson Day unity dinners (later merged into Jefferson-Jackson Day events), but within the American public – honored from Mount Rushmore to the nickel (not coincidentally, first minted in 1938 during FDR’s second term).

The Democrats turned on Jefferson

This veneration ended when Democrats veered into the cancel-culture abyss of the 2010s, ostensibly over the issue of slavery.

One state Democratic Party after another (including Virginia) removed Jefferson’s name from its annual dinner. They did so despite the historical context (a majority of pre-Civil War presidents, including George Washington, owned slaves) and despite Jefferson’s efforts to abolish slavery, prevent its expansion, and end the international slave trade (see here).

The principal author of our Declaration of Independence, our third president, a man lionized by the Democratic Party’s giants from FDR to Harry Truman to JFK to Hubert Humphrey to Bill Clinton was now deemed not virtuous enough to have a dinner named in his honor. Essentially, Democrats orphaned Jefferson.

President Trump and the Republican Party have an opportunity to set things right. Republicans should adopt the orphaned Jefferson. FDR actually anticipated something of this sort when he said “I think of Jefferson as belonging to the rank and file of both major political parties today.”

Name the new ballroom after Thomas Jefferson

This adoption ought to be declared concretely by naming the new White House ballroom in his honor: The Jefferson Ballroom.

Seven reasons for this come to mind.

1. Most importantly, in celebrating the 250^th year of our nation, it is fitting to honor Jefferson as the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. For this, but in many other ways as well, Jefferson deserves to be honored as an American hero.
2. Following the first lesson, honoring Jefferson would be unifying for reasonable and proud Americans. Jefferson himself called for unity in the nation and between the two major parties (as they were named in his day) in his first inaugural address: “We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.”
3. Following the second lesson, it would put radical Democrats in a self-created awkward position. If they approve, they would be committing the leftist sin of approving President Trump’s action. If they disapprove, they highlight their extremism.
4. Jefferson’s political principles are fully embraced by today’s Republicans – the conservative principle that the best government is the least necessary government, the populist focus that government should serve average Americans, the core value of free speech, and a commitment to strong American nationalism.

Did Trump imitate Jefferson?

5. Like President Trump, President Jefferson used his presidential powers boldly and sometimes unconventionally in the nation’s interests (see the Louisiana Purchase, the First Barbary War against pirates in the Mediterranean, and pardoning victims of President Adams’ Sedition Act).
6. It would be a wholly appropriate and gracious gesture by President Trump. (See, he doesn’t name everything after himself.)
7. Naming the ballroom in Jefferson’s honor might make it more difficult for an intemperate successor president to tear the ballroom down.

Study #2: the 2022 Midterm

The second study is of Biden’s anomalous 2022 midterm (here). In the run up to that election, all signs – including President Biden’s weak approval ratings – pointed to substantial Republican gains, “a red wave.” Yet the anticipated red wave hit shore as a weak ripple. Democrats over-performed by quite a bit, losing only nine House seats. This was a mysterious November surprise, a highly unusual midterm.

The study’s goal was to solve this mystery. Unlike conventional, poll-centric studies narrowly based on post-election exit polls, my more comprehensive study examined a very broad range of evidence (including polls, expert race-ratings, election laws, campaign spending, turnout, election forecasts, etc.), the state and district distribution of those factors, their changes over the course of the campaign, and comparisons to previous elections, always focused on solving the mystery.

So what happened to the red wave?

Voters didn’t turn on the Democrats – but Democrats (mis)counted the votes

First, what didn’t happen. Democrats didn’t fare better than expected because voters changed their minds about them. There was no epiphany. The election was not decided by the will of the people, either a repudiation of the Republicans or a vindication of the Democrats. Democrats over-performed all indications of the public’s verdict, even those on the eve of the election.

November’s surprising Republican shortfall was the result of lax absentee mail-in-voting election laws and rules in states with politically competitive races combined with the Democratic Party’s well-financed campaigns and vote mobilization organizations in those states. The anomaly of 2022 was a consequence of what amounts to 21^st-century Democratic Party machine politics coupled with the Republican Party’s failure to prevent it or counter it.

Two Lessons From the 2022 Midterm

The first lesson is that if Republicans are to prevent another unusual midterm in which Democrats over-perform their standing with the public, they must reform the election system to make it less dependent on campaign spending and vote mobilization organizations. Democratic elections should reflect the will of voting-eligible adult American citizens, not how much the parties spend to round up votes or how they otherwise configure election rules to their benefit.

The SAVE Act requiring proof of citizenship to register and a valid photo ID to vote would be a good start and should help restore greater confidence in elections. Despite protestations, these SAVE Act reforms are not new. Two recommendations of the bipartisan Carter-Baker Commission on Federal Election Reform’s “Building Confidence in U.S. Elections” report in 2005 were that states “obtain proof of citizenship before registering voters” (recommendation 2.5.2) and “ensure that persons presenting themselves at the polling place are the ones on the registration list” (recommendation 2.5.1). In short, the SAVE Act.

Despite this distinguished bipartisan pedigree, these reforms proposed 21 years ago and widely accepted by other Western democracies are now oddly controversial. They are denounced by Democrats and their allied media (here, here, and here). Sen. Schumer denigrated them as “Jim Crow 2.0.”

Pass the SAVE Act – by hook or by crook

This long overdue important election integrity legislation, now blocked by the threat of a Senate filibuster, should become law whether by reconciliation, by compromise (perhaps the government could be proactive in securing birth certificates or naturalization papers), or by changing Senate rules to reduce the number of votes needed for cloture, while preserving the filibuster – as the Senate did in 1975.

Beyond the SAVE Act and based on the 2022 study, two additional reforms could make our elections less susceptible to political money and machine politics: shortening the duration of early absentee voting and increasing absentee-ballot and drop-box security. For most of our history, Election Day meant exactly that – a day. Voting was entirely in person, except for requested absentee balloting. Several states now allow voting for over a month before Election Day, and some use entirely mail-in balloting. Such long voting periods with no-excuse absentee balloting unintentionally serve party mischief and weaken confidence in elections more than they intentionally serve voter convenience.

The second lesson of 2022 is that whatever election rules are finally adopted and whatever they permit, Republicans should not be caught flat-footed again. Republicans should be prepared (targeted money and organization) to counteract the use of the rules by the Democrats. If they don’t, they run the risk of Democrats again over-performing their standing with the public.

Joining the Two Studies

Elections are won or lost on two fronts: substance and process. Substance refers to the will of the electorate. Process refers to election laws and rules and how effectively the candidates and parties use them. The 1934 study focused on election substance and the 2022 study on the process. Ideally, election outcomes should reflect as purely as possible the will of the people, the substance. But in practice, both matter. If a party wins or loses a seat on either front, it counts the same.

What are the current process and substance outlooks?

On the process front, the Democrats continue to hold the advantage. The “red wave” of public opinion in 2022 was overridden by election rules amplifying the Democrats’ big money and organizational advantages. Four years later, not much has changed. Democrats racked up a string of victories in odd-year and special elections – where highly focused process advantages matter most.

The SAVE Act languishes in the Senate, and other important election integrity reforms are not on the table. Unless a well-kept secret, Republicans have not built the infrastructure required to counteract the Democrats’ ground game. And, at this point, the net partisan effects of both the mid-decade gerrymandering in red and blue states and of the court’s racial districting decision are uncertain, with Republicans currently having an edge (two views here and here).

Republicans can win on substance – so long as they wrap up the Iran war quickly

On the substance front, although President Trump’s handling of the military action in Iran is unpopular with swing voters (moderates, independents and others), if peace can be secured soon and the economy reignited with lower energy prices, Republicans would seem to have a good chance of reestablishing their advantage on the merits.

As recounted above, despite a Democrat-inclined legacy media, Republicans hold the more popular positions and records on most major issues – border control, lower taxes, pro-growth policies, a strong national defense, an America-first foreign policy and much more – and all in contrast to the positions and record of the Biden years (here).

Republican practical policies with real results for all Americans as opposed to the Democrats’ progressive ideological policies should be especially appealing to average, pragmatic Americans who hold the balance in our hyper-polarized elections.

Republicans also have unusual allies in winning over these average American voters: prominent Democrats. The sharply contrasting party appeals to swing voters can be boiled down to that chilling non-response of congressional Democrats to President Trump’s question at the last State of the Union address. Expect to see a great deal of it.

Democrats have little interest in reaching beyond their base

But their assistance goes well beyond that. Many progressive Democrats show surprisingly little interest in appealing beyond their ideological base (here, here, and here). Though unmeasured, the attitude of Democratic leaders toward average Americans seems to range from neglect to elitist disdain. FDR’s observation, “in that kind of foolishness lies our strength,” remains apt.

From the contrasting appeals of their policies and their records of results as well as their rapport with average Americans, one might expect most potential swing voters to see Republicans as the preferable midterm choice. But even if so, will they turn out to vote?

Turnout is routinely lower outside the ideological bases of the parties, and turnout in midterms is always lower than in presidential years. These turnout questions are Republican problems.

The Campaign Solution

Assuming the above has it about right, Republicans should conduct the 2026 campaign like a high-intensity, high-turnout presidential campaign – not like a typical midterm campaign. As much as is possible, 2026 should be 2024 2.0 – a contrasting retrospective election about the pre- and post-2024 records.

An “on-year” intensity-level campaign could counter the Democrats’ advantages on the process front (the rules-money-organization machine politics problem) and inspire greater turnout among potential swing voters, giving Republicans a boost on the substance front.

Although Trump, Biden, and Harris are not literally on the ballots, a full-throttle campaign should make sure their records are in every voter’s head.

Without records and proposals with broad appeal to those outside their base, Democrats (and their allied media) will no doubt try to make the midterm a referendum on Trump.

For their part, following FDR’s lead, Republicans should make the midterm an election contrasting the records. Which party has been more successful in trying to solve America’s problems? Biden and Harris’ Democrats who created and left a raft of problems – much like Hoover left FDR and Carter left Reagan? Or Trump’s Republicans who are in the midst of trying to clean up the mess they inherited to get America back on the right track?

If voters see it this way, it could make 2026 an unusual midterm – one less like 2022 and more like 1934.

This article was originally published by RealClearPolitics and made available via RealClearWire.