Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu: Back to the Future

Writing in The Diplomat, Sam Goodman, senior policy director at the China Risks Institute, worries that China may attempt to annex the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands, which are part of the Republic of China (Taiwan) but are geographically located just a few miles from the People’s Republic of China. Goodman reminds readers that Mao Zedong “long viewed Kinmen and Matsu as a noose with which to bind Taiwan to mainland China and prevent Taiwan from declaring its independence.” Goodman, citing a paper by Andrew Yeh, characterizes such a move as part of China’s “gray zone” tactics that would fall short of an invasion or blockade of Taiwan and, therefore, might not produce a strong response from the United States and its allies, but which would have significant long-term consequences for America’s position in the western Pacific.

Previous attacks on Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu

We have been here before. Twice in the 1950s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shelled and bombed Kinmen (then called Quemoy) and Matsu in what became known as the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises. In 1954-55, Chinese communist forces seized some offshore islands, tried to invade Big Kinmen Island, began to shell Quemoy and Matsu, and called for the “liberation” of Taiwan (then commonly called Formosa). The CCP leadership viewed (and still views) Taiwan’s de facto independence as the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War.

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower successfully urged Congress to pass the Formosa Resolution, which stated in part that it was in the vital interests of the United States that Taiwan and its smaller islands remain in control of governments friendly to the United States. The resolution cited the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of China (ROC)–which is still in effect today. The resolution authorized the president “to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.”

Beginning of the American posture

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Far East Commander Gen. John Hull and the Pacific Commander Adm. Felix Stump that U.S. air and naval units should be prepared if necessary to participate with Republic of China (ROC) forces to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores, and “some of the offshore islands.” In January 1955, Ichiang island fell to communist forces. U.S. Navy ships evacuated about 40,000 ROC soldiers and civilians from the Tachen islands. U.S. air squadrons were sent to Taiwan. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned China that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan. The Chinese Communists ended the shelling of the islands.

Three years later in August 1958, the CCP shelled Quemoy and Matsu again (firing more than 40,000 artillery rounds), used its warplanes to strafe and bomb the islands, and imposed a naval blockade. The Soviet Union publicly pledged to help Beijing liberate Taiwan. Secretary of State Dulles warned Beijing not to attempt to seize the islands. Eisenhower sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, increased the number of warships in the region (including the aircraft carriers Essex and Midway and their destroyer escorts), and again threatened to use nuclear weapons against China. U.S. air forces were instructed to be prepared to strike Chinese coastal air bases. They were also told to be prepared, if authorized by the president, to make atomic strikes deep into mainland China.

Air-to-air clashes

Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration imposed restraints on Chiang Kai-shek’s government. There were air-to-air clashes between PRC and ROC forces. There were clashes at sea between PRC and ROC forces as the Nationalists attempted to break through the PRC blockade. Ultimately, the PRC backed down again. Deterrence had worked both in 1954-55 and in 1958.

Goodman sees China’s “gray zone” moves as more sophisticated and more likely to succeed than Mao’s attacks in the 1950s. Kinmen’s residents support greater links to the mainland, and the CCP has proposed Kinmen’s inclusion in a “special economic zone” and has discussed building a bridge to connect Kinmen with PRC-held Xiamen. Kinmen also is dependent on China for 68 percent of its water via the “Kinmen-China water pipeline.” Goodman expects that the CCP will use “disinformation” and “political interference” to attempt to separate Kinmen from Taiwan. Goodman warns that “[a]ny attempt by Beijing to annex Kinmen and destabilize the status quo would make the possibility of the PRC invading or embargoing Taiwan even more likely.”

Kinmen and Matsu all over again

In the 1950s, we had leaders of the caliber of Eisenhower, Nixon (who was Vice-President) and Dulles, China lacked atomic weapons, and we had nuclear superiority over China’s Soviet allies, and our military forces were superior to China’s in the western Pacific. Deterrence worked. Today, we have a president who is cognitively impaired, a vice-president who has zero experience in foreign policy, and a secretary of state who has yet to inspire confidence. Today, China has a sizeable inventory of nuclear weapons that is growing every day, naval and conventional superiority in the western Pacific, and an immense geographical advantage vis-a-vis the United States. With Kinmen and Matsu, we are back to the future–but that future looks increasingly bleak.

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.